Σάββατο 6 Ιουνίου 2009
The Right to Survive: The humanitarian challenge in the twenty-first century :: Oxfam GB
The Right to Survive: The humanitarian challenge in the twenty-first century :: Oxfam GB
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Κυριακή 22 Μαρτίου 2009
Παγκόσμια Ημέρα Νερού
"Το νερό είναι ο πολυτιμότερος φυσικός μας πόρος. Σήμερα, η συνεργασία για τη συνετή του χρήση είναι περισσότερο απαραίτητη από ποτέ", αναφέρει σε μήνυμά του με αφορμή την Παγκόσμια Ημέρα Νερού που εορτάζεται στις 22 Μαρτίου, ο ΓΓ του ΟΗΕ, Μπαν Γκι-Μουν.
Σημειώνει ότι "ενώ ο παγκόσμιος πληθυσμός καταναλώνει περισσότερο πόσιμο νερό, η κλιματική αλλαγή έχει ως συνέπεια τη μείωση του νερού σε πολλές περιοχές του κόσμου. Οι πάγοι λιώνουν, η πρόβλεψη των βροχοπτώσεων γίνεται δυσκολότερη, ενώ φαινόμενα όπως οι πλημμύρες και οι ξηρασίες γίνονται ολοένα και πιο ακραία. Η προσεκτική διαχείριση των υδάτινων πόρων και η εξισορρόπηση των διάφορων αναγκών για νερό είναι ζητήματα ζωτικής σημασίας".
Ο ΓΓ του ΟΗΕ στο μήνυμά του επισημαίνει επίσης τα εξής: "Μεγάλο μέρος των υπόγειων ή υπέργειων υδάτων του πλανήτη είναι κοινό. Το 40% του παγκόσμιου πληθυσμού ζει σε μια από τις 263 υδάτινες λεκάνες που είναι μοιρασμένες ανάμεσα σε δύο ή περισσότερες χώρες. Η ανησυχία για την πιθανότητα βίαιων συγκρούσεων είναι μέρος των συζητήσεων σχετικά με την κατανομή των περιορισμένων υδάτινων πόρων. Ωστόσο, ενώ οι πιθανότητες να λειτουργήσει το νερό ως καταλύτης συγκρούσεων μεταξύ κρατών και κοινοτήτων είναι υπαρκτές, το παρελθόν δείχνει ότι στην πραγματικότητα συμβαίνει το αντίθετο. Η συνεργασία, όχι η σύγκρουση αποτελεί την πιο συνηθισμένη απάντηση στις ανταγωνιστικές απαιτήσεις που αντιμετωπίζουν οι άνθρωποι.
Με θέμα "Κοινά Αποθέματα Νερού - Κοινές Ευκαιρίες", ο εορτασμός της φετινής Παγκόσμιας Ημέρας Νερού εστιάζει στο πώς οι διασυνοριακοί υδάτινοι πόροι μπορούν να λειτουργήσουν ως μια ενωτική δύναμη. Σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο υπάρχουν τουλάχιστον 300 διεθνείς συμφωνίες για το νερό, συχνά μεταξύ αντιτιθέμενων πλευρών. Οι συμφωνίες αυτές δείχνουν το πώς οι κοινοί υδάτινοι πόροι μπορούν να ενισχύσουν την εμπιστοσύνη και να προωθήσουν την ειρήνη μεταξύ των κρατών. Η πολιτική βούληση, ένα ευέλικτο πλαίσιο πολιτικής, τα ισχυρά θεσμικά όργανα και μια συνολική προσέγγιση, θα μας βοηθήσουν να οικοδομήσουμε σε αυτά τα θεμέλια για το καλό όλων.
Τη φετινή Παγκόσμια Ημέρα Νερού καλώ τις κυβερνήσεις, την κοινωνία των πολιτών, τον ιδιωτικό τομέα και όλα τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη να αναγνωρίσουν ότι το συλλογικό μας μέλλον εξαρτάται από το πώς θα διαχειριστούμε τους πολύτιμους και πεπερασμένους υδάτινους πόρους".
Σάββατο 21 Μαρτίου 2009
Κυριακή 1 Μαρτίου 2009
MIDEAST: Rice Is Aid, Pasta Not
RAMALLAH, Feb 27 (IPS) - Red-faced and unusually tongue-tied Israeli officials were forced to try and explain to U.S. Senator John Kerry during his visit to Israel last week why truckloads of pasta waiting to enter the besieged Gaza strip were not considered humanitarian aid while rice was.
Kerry, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, visited the coastal territory on a fact-finding mission.
The purpose of the visit was to assess the humanitarian situation on the ground and the level of destruction wrought by Israel's three-week military assault on Gaza, codenamed Operation Cast Lead.
During his visit to Gaza it came to the senator's attention that Israel had prevented a number of trucks loaded with pasta from entering the territory.
UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) officials explained to Kerry that Israel was only permitting limited amounts of humanitarian aid into Gaza, and the definition of what the Israelis consider humanitarian was restricted.
"Pasta is not regarded as humanitarian aid and is not allowed in to Gaza while rice is," an UNRWA official told Kerry.
Kerry then questioned Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak directly about the logic of the restriction on pasta. Following his intervention, the truckloads of pasta were eventually permitted to enter Gaza.
Over a hundred aid trucks are currently entering Gaza on a daily basis. This is more than the number of trucks that were permitted entry during the ceasefire with Hamas which lasted nearly five months until Israel launched a cross-border military raid into Gaza on Nov. 4.
However, according to the UN, the overall level of imports remain well below the 475 trucks allowed in daily before Israel's blockade of Gaza in June 2007 when Hamas took control.
Aid organisations say the current number is insufficient to meet the market's needs as well as the shortfall resulting from months of severe restrictions.
The Palestine Trade Centre (Paltrade) estimates that in order for any sort of economical revival to begin, exports should resume immediately and a minimum of 850 truckloads of market-triggered imports per day should be allowed entry.
"Although the situation has improved in comparison to several months ago, the amount of aid allowed in is still too little compared to the pre-blockade scenario," said UNRWA spokesman Sammay Mshasha.
"Furthermore, when the delivery of aid is restricted to an argument of pasta vs rice, then the situation becomes a little ridiculous. No security reasons justify a blockade on pasta," Mshasha told IPS.
"Rebuilding Gaza's infrastructure is vital but the Israelis are not allowing glass in to fix shattered windows. No cement or steel is being permitted in either. We have had construction material waiting in warehouses from 22 months ago, long before the war," added Mshasha.
An estimated 15,000 buildings in Gaza were destroyed during Operation Cast Lead, causing 50,000 Palestinians to flee their homes and seek emergency shelter. Thousands have no home to return to, while thousands of others returned to homes extensively damaged.
Mike Bailey, a spokesman from Oxfam, which is involved in humanitarian aid and projects aimed at rehabilitating Gaza, said one of the major problems was the goods not getting into Gaza.
"About 80 percent of the aid getting in is food but even there, there are restrictions on stuff such as fruit juice and pasta," Bailey told IPS.
Medicine and medical equipment accounts for another 12 percent of aid getting in, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
"However essentials such as clothing, school textbooks, agricultural products including seedlings, fertiliser and piping are banned. The agricultural industry will take time to be rehabilitated, and that is why it is imperative that these items are allowed in," explained Bailey.
Fuel supplies and spare parts for Gaza's sewage and water treatment plants and hospitals have also been severely restricted. This has forced tonnes of untreated sewage to be pumped into the sea on a daily basis thereby threatening Gaza's underground drinking water supply.
Israel has also clamped down on the entrance of NGOs entering Gaza. Of the 178 requests to enter Gaza submitted by International NGOs' staff members and recorded by OCHA during January, only 18 NGO staff were approved as of the end of the month, while no answer was received for the rest.
Two weeks ago, four senior EU officials sent a letter to a number of Israeli government ministers and Yitzhak Herzog, the minister charged with humanitarian aid transfers to the Gaza Strip in particular.
The letter protested the delays in the flow of aid through the crossings into Gaza. The officials also demanded that Israel formulate a clear policy on this issue.
On Wednesday angry U.S. State Department officials lashed out too. The State Department said it normally tried to avoid criticising Israel in regard to its treatment of the flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, it explained that the current crisis on the ground there required the immediate delivery of as many basic supplies as possible.
"Israel is not making enough effort to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza," a senior U.S. official told Israeli counterparts last week. He reiterated Washington's view that the U.S. expects Israel to meet its commitments on this matter.
When asked whether the U.S. believed that Israel was holding up humanitarian aid as a tool to secure the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, State Department spokesman Robert Wood answered, "Aid should never be used as a political weapon."
Further criticism came from an unusual quarter when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, renowned for being staunchly pro-Israel, expressed anger at the obstacles Israel was putting in the way of aid delivery.
Political sources in Jerusalem noted that senior Clinton aides have made it clear that the matter will be central to Clinton's planned visit to Israel on Tuesday.
U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, who arrived in Israel on Thursday is also expected to issue a sharp commentary on the subject to Israel. (END/2009)
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MIDEAST: Rice Is Aid,
Pasta Not
Σάββατο 28 Φεβρουαρίου 2009
A turn for the better in Congo?
Home News Regional News A turn for the better in Congo?
A turn for the better in Congo?
Wednesday, 25 February 2009 20:03 By J. Peter Pham
Recent events on the ground in Congo have led both to an escalation of conflict and, paradoxically, to the possibility that a comprehensive resolution to the longstanding regional instability might be in sight.
General Nkunda (L) walking through the area he controlled in North Kivu in DRC.
At the root of the DRC’s problems is the artificial nature of the Congolese state. More than a century ago, the immense natural wealth of Congo led King Leopold II of Belgium to hire Henry Morton Stanley to carve out for him a territory 76 times larger than his kingdom in Europe. No move was ever made to right this historical wrong of throwing together in a single unit the size of western Europe an explosive mixture of peoples with little historical basis for national cohesion.
This state of affairs has largely determined the course of events in the DRC. As what had passed for central government essentially withered, various armed groups seized control of patches of territory, acquiring effective dominion over strategic assets which they used to acquire the resources to combat opposing factions.
The 2002 “Sun City Agreement” brokered by then-South African president Thabo Mbeki was supposed to put an end to all the strifes. However, the terms of the accord were never fully implemented, despite the presence of the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world today, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (MONUC). The 2006 national elections did little more than bestow a thin veneer of electoral respectability on an unsavoury cast of characters, including President Joseph Kabila who, before he was even 30 years old, had inherited the presidential mantle from his assassinated warlord father Laurent.
Not surprisingly, despite the formal “peace,” conflicts continued in various parts of the DRC before and after the elections. In eastern Congo, particularly the provinces of North and South Kivu, militiamen loyal to the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), a largely Tutsi group led by General Laurent Nkunda and surreptitiously backed by Rwanda, continued its fight against the Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a group of armed Hutu insurgents, including some responsible for the 1994 genocide, which enjoyed the backing of the Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and, presumably, of the Kabila regime. By 2007, Nkunda, who is sought on an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for abducting children and using them in combat, was in open rebellion against the far-off government in Kinshasa. After the collapse of several attempts at mediation, fighting broke out anew in the autumn of 2008, which resulted in the CNDP gaining control of most of North Kivu after the FARDC failed spectacularly in an attempt to take down General Nkunda in open battle.
In December, in the Rwandan resort town of Gisenyi, just across the border from the North Kivu capital of Goma, I asked international observers and Rwandan officials for their assessment of the situation. One thing was clear: that nothing would change unless the Kabila regime 1) acknowledged the reality of the CNDP, with which it was refusing to talk, and 2) addressed the concerns of Rwanda over the continuing presence on Congolese territory of the Hutu killers.
Whatever anyone else might think of Nkunda’s CNDP, the movement was viewed by many residents of the Kivus as their protector against the predations of FARDC troops and irregular forces allied to them. While CNDP militiamen are generally not paid for their service, they are fed and receive medical care. Their families likewise benefit from a basic social welfare system. In short, the group has earned legitimacy by providing its adherents – whose ranks have expanded beyond the core Tutsi base to embrace other ethnic groups, including Hutu – with the social goods that the Kabila regime has thus far failed to provide.
Given Rwanda’s recent history, it is understandable that President Paul Kagame is troubled by the thousands of armed Hutus are just over the border, to say nothing of the support that Kinshasa gives to the militia. After all, the FDLR makes no secret of its ambitions: its website, emblazoned with the flag of the “Hutu power” regime that ruled Rwanda from 1962 until 1994, brands the current government in Kigali “tyrannic [sic] and barbaric “ and proclaims its goal to “liberate Rwanda.” The FDLR supports itself by operating primitive mines in the areas under its control, in collaboration with Congolese businessmen. What sovereign state, much less one that undergone the trauma that Rwanda has, could be expected to put up with such a provocation?
While the Nairobi talks continued, shifts were taking place closer to the ground. A few weeks ago, the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) chief of staff, General James Kabarebe, flew to Kinshasa to meet President Kabila, causing a flurry of rumours about a secret deal. A week later, a group of CNDP leaders announced that it had removed Nkunda. While Nkunda’s supporters discounted the manoeuvre, it gained traction when General Kabarebe appeared alongside DRC interior minister Célestin Mbuyu at a meeting of the dissident CNDP leaders, who declared a ceasefire and said that they were prepared to integrate into the FARDC to fight the FDLR.
But these developments were but a prelude for the entente between Kigali and Kinshasa that followed. First, Rwandan troops entered eastern DRC, with Kinshasa’s assent, to pursue the FDLR. Reports are that up to 7,000 Rwandan troops were sent in the effort to flush out the Hutu militia. Second, and perhaps the biggest surprise of all, Rwandan forces arrested General Nkunda, who had entered Rwanda as the joint operation began. The arrest sparked demonstrations – which were quickly dispersed – by Congolese Tutsis, including some in refugee camps in Rwanda, among whom the general is still popular.
This turn of events may present a significant opportunity to break the logjam that has kept the heart of Africa locked in conflict. If military coordination between Kigali and Kinshasa can lead to security cooperation, then perhaps the two neighbours, so long at odds, may come to believe that it is in their interests to strive for a comprehensive political settlement and then, with effort and a bit of luck, joint economic development, leveraging the comparative advantages of each country: Congo’s natural wealth and Rwanda’s growing economy – it grew 10 percent in 2008 – along with its efficient government and enterprise-friendly policies.
Of course, for now, this is all aspiration. More immediately, the Rwandan intervention raises a number of questions, beginning with how long the RDF will remain in the two Kivus. Among the Hutu militants being pursued across North Kivu are some 7,000 individuals wanted in Rwanda for having taken part in the genocide. Certainly the Rwandan forces cannot be expected to withdraw until the FDLR is totally disarmed, a task which MONUC, with its 18,422 personnel and annual budget of $1.2bn, has been unable to accomplish in eight years. Even if the Hutus no longer pose a military threat to the Rwandan state, any government in Kigali would still have a tutelary interest in the fate of the Tutsi minority in eastern Congo. Add to these calculations the temptations of the region’s abundant resources and one could see a scenario whereby Rwanda maintains a presence in the Kivus for some time, either openly through a status of forces agreement with the Kabila regime in Kinshasa or via proxy in the form of a reconstituted CNDP, presumably under a more malleable leader than the irascible General Nkunda.
The international community has been slow to react to these changing dynamics. President Barack Obama, whose foreign policy agenda on the White House website specifically cites “countering instability in Congo” as an example of his Senate record of “bringing people together ... to advance important policy initiatives,” has yet to even nominate an assistant secretary to head the state department’s Africa bureau, much less a special envoy to deal with the various conflicts across the Great Lakes region, most of which are beyond the scope of any one ambassador’s mission. The UN has done little more than to send the secretary-general’s special representative in the DRC, Alan Doss, on another fact-finding tour of North Kivu. As for the African Union, the chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, managed to make it through his late January press conference without even mentioning the word “Congo.” Despite these disappointments, the mere fact that Rwanda and the Congo are not pulling in entirely opposite directions, at least for the moment, is in itself reason enough to give rise to hope.
J. Peter Pham is Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C., as well as Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA). His recent publications include “Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State” (Reed Press, 2004), and “Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy” (Nova Science Publishers, 2005).
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A turn for the better in Congo?
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